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Paradigm Shift:
A Challenge to Naturalism
Gary R. Habermas
Professor of Philosophy and Apologetics
Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia

Idealism was the dominant philosophy in the Western world in
the early 20th century, a holdover from its prominence in the previous century. Stressing the metaphysical reality of mind or spirit and
the epistemological centrality of ideas, idealism stood in stark contrast to naturalism, which took its position as the dominant school of
thought in the middle of this century. Naturalistic convictions often
included the supreme reality of matter, the belief that nature could
potentially explain all phenomena, and faith in the empirical, scientific method as the chief means of discovering facts. Such beliefs
continue to exercise control on many areas of study.
One interesting facet of the history of ideas is the possibility
that either new data or new ways of interpreting the data will encourage new paradigm (or world view) shifts in thinking. 1 Many
trends indicate that just such a major shift may now be taking place.
Just as idealism gave way to naturalism earlier this century, naturalism may now be losing its position of supremacy as a world view.
Physicists Puthoff and Targ, after research at Stanford Research Institute, published Mind-Reach,
whose first chapter,
"When the Paranormal Becomes Normal," appropriately asks,
"Where will you be standing when the paradigm shifts?"2 The authors consider that a shift in thinking may be occurring.

1
Of special interest is Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). The present article uses the term
"paradigm" to denote a world view, or an interpretive model for explaining reality.
2

Harold Puthoff and Russell Targ, Mind-Reach (New York: Dell Publishing Co.,
1978).
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In agreement with this thesis Koestler explains that a "profound transformation of the physicist's world view" is now taking
place—a change that involves the shattering of many established
scientific concepts. He holds that those who ridicule the recent studies in parapsychology are in approximately the same position as
those who belittled Einsteinian physics earlier this century. A similar breakthrough in studies of the human mind may now be imminent. 3
An issue of the SCP Journal was dedicated to an investigation of
these changing trends. As reported by Fetcho: "Science, the health
professions, and the arts, not to mention psychology and religion, are
all engaged in a fundamental reconstruction of their basic premises." 4
In another article Albrecht and Alexander note the rising influence
of these new developments:
In the last five years, however, both the scope and the intensity of the
occult/mystical encroachment upon the consciousness of the scientific
"establishment" have greatly increased. . . . Certainly the Eastern/occult view of reality is riding on the momentum of a cultural and
intellectual shift of enormous proportions—and not just in physics.5
What reasons may be given for such alleged changes in the contemporary world view? As Kuhn points out, one paradigm is often
basically intolerant of change, even though nature must frequently be
forced into its inflexible conception of reality. Further, contrary facts
are sometimes ignored. 6 Some believe that naturalists are often
guilty of suppressing the facts to propagate their dogma.
A more subjective reason for change is that people are ready for
a new way of thinking. When such a time arrives, a different model
suddenly "appears" and begins to influence contemporary thought. 7
A number of factors suggest that the influence of the naturalistic,
radically empirical paradigm may be declining. Naturalism fails to
give an adequate answer in four areas: methodology, the origin of
life, theistic argumentation, and philosophy of the mind. 8
0

Arthur Koestler, The Roots of Coincidence: An Excursion into Parapsychology
(New York: Random House, 1972), p. 50.
David Fetcho, "In Face of the Tempest, Jonah Sleeps," SCP Journal, August 1978, p.

3.
5

Mark Albrecht and Brooks Alexander, "The Sellout of Science," SCP Journal, August 1978, pp. 19, 26.
"

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 24.

Compare Kuhn's major thesis with that of C. S. Lewis in one of his technical
works, The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), esp. pp. 218-23.
The purpose of this article is not to develop contemporary arguments in each area,
but rather to chart trends that may illustrate a general direction in recent thought. It
is hoped that presenting a survey of the research of numerous scholars will acquaint
the reader with a broad perspective of where new paradigms may be headed.
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Methodology
The naturalistic conviction that the scientific method of empirical observation and testing is the only (or the supreme) guide to
knowledge has been a popular belief in many circles. Along with
this position is the view that nature's laws can explain all phenomena apart from any deity or divine purpose. Science alone yields
knowable truth and other methods are unable to reveal factual
knowledge. The majority of scholars, however, hold that this
methodology is much too narrow and that there are other viable
ways to learn. The question here is not whether the scientific
method is a means of discovering truth, for virtually all hold that it
is useful in ascertaining factual data. The issue is whether naturalism is an adequate world view by which to explain all events and
facts. In other words in order for naturalism to be a viable paradigm,
it must account for all data because it allows for no other source. But
many philosophers hold that while the scientific method and
mechanistic concept of nature are useful in understanding portions of
the universe, they are inadequate to explain all reality. 9
Also many have pointed out that there is no empirical verification of the belief that the scientific method is the only way to know
facts. That is, there is no empirical means by which one can demonstrate that the only way to learn is by scientific empiricism. A comment by Brightman, leveled against mechanism, is applicable to
naturalism as a whole:
If we declare that mechanism is the sole and complete explanation of
everything we are going far beyond scientific verification. . . . It is arbi. trary and unphilosophical to take one aspect of our scientific experience, such as the principle of mechanism, and extend it so as to cancel
the meaning of our most meaningful experiences.10
Thus one may hold that the scientific method is a superior one
without being the only one. What may be the best method cannot be
confused with the only truth.
Just as the verification principle failed its own test of verifiability, thereby providing a major factor in the downfall of logical
positivism earlier this century, so it is now being realized that any
belief in strict empiricism is largely problematic for the same reasons—such a belief cannot be verified. One cannot demonstrate that
scientific empiricism is the only way to learn; to suggest that it is

This is not a new development in philosophy, either. For example see Edgar
Sheffield Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), p.
277.
10

Ibid., pp. 377-78; cf. p. 487.
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confuses good evidence with the only evidence. Knowable reality is
broader than allowed by the naturalistic paradigm; naturalism fails
as the only approach to truth. Other evidence points to a reality be
yond that of the naturalistic paradigm.
Origin of Life
Naturalism cannot give an adequate account of the origin of life.
Naturalism postulates that at some point life arose from nonlife.
Spontaneous generation of some variety is therefore required. How
ever, science has long rejected such a hypothesis. As such, natural
ism attempts to describe the survival of the fittest without explain
ing the arrival of the fittest. 11
Naturalistic science is unable to supply an answer to this ques
tion of life; atheistic evolution is incapable of adequately accounting
for the data. Numerous scientific efforts involving probability the
ory have revealed that it is extremely improbable that chance could
produce even the first complete set of genes and the proteins needed
for minimal life. Coppedge found that even after making several
concessions to chance the probability of a random sequence yielding
just one gene or protein is 10 2 3 6 . 1 2 Calculations by other scientists,
even from a naturalistic, evolutionary perspective, similarly reveal
that there is only an infinitesimal chance for such a beginning for
life. The naturalistic physicist Guye spoke of a probability of 2.02 χ
I O 2 3 1 for chance dissymetry in an extremely simple protein. 1 3 Salis
bury suggested a probability of 10 4 1 5 for mutations accounting for a
new enzyme. 1 4 Yale biophysicist Morowitz calculated a probability
of 1 chance in i o 3 3 9 ' 9 9 9 ' 8 6 6 for the chance formation of the correct bond
energies for a minimal cell. 15 Quastler postulated two extreme limits
of the improbability of life occurring by chance. The smaller figure
was 1 in 1 0 2 5 5 while the larger extreme was approximately 1 in 10 to
the three trillionth power (13 digits). 1 6

11

y¿

Ibid, ρ 379

" James F Coppedge, Evolution Possible or Impossible7 (Grand Rapids
Publishing House, 1973), esp pp 230-36

Zondervan

1
° Charles-Eugène Guye, reported in Pierre Lecomte du Nouy, Human Destiny (New
York Longmans, Green and Co , 1947), pp 33-34, as cited by Coppedge, Evolution Possible or Impossible7 ρ 234
1 4

Frank Β Salisbury, "Natural Selection and the Complexity of the Gene," Nature,
October 25, 1969, ρ 234, cf Coppedge, Evolution Possible or Impossible7 ρ 235
1 5

Harold J Morowitz, Energy Flow in Biology (New York Academic Press, 1968), ρ
99, cited in Coppedge, Evolution Possible or Impossible7 ρ 235
1 6

Henry Quastler, The Emergence of Biological Organization (New Haven, CT Yale
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Naturalists typically respond that life in the universe could
have occurred by chance because of the vast amount of time—about 20
billion years. However, this begs the question in favor of natural
ism, and as many have pointed out, even this is not enough time. Us
ing Guye's probability figure, even if the possible combinations were
produced at the speed of light, it would take 10 2 4 3 billions of years to
obtain even one protein molecule on earth! 1 7
More recently astronomer Hoyle and his colleague Wickramasinghe concluded that there is only one chance in 1 0 4 0 ' 0 0 0 that even a
single enzyme could have evolved by random processes, a figure that
is "statistically impossible." It would require more attempts to form
one enzyme than there are atoms in all the stars in all the known
galaxies. This statistic was not arrived at by guessing but by
computations based on the necessary components of enzymes.
Therefore according to Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, spontaneous
generation is impossible, requiring a miracle. "Because of the impos
sibility of the chance formation and development of life anywhere
in the universe" 1 8 and since the universe is not eternal, they have
abandoned the steady state theory Hoyle helped formulate years
ago. 1 9
Yockey studied the likelihood that naturalistic processes could
account for the origin of life, which would involve some form of spon
taneous biogenesis. He concentrated on explanations for the existence
of information content in living organisms as contained in DNA. 2 0
There is more information in the DNA in one human cell than there
is in all the books in the Library of Congress, and that one cell con
tains far more information than there is human knowledge concerning
21
the entire universe!
Yockey concluded that the spontaneous origin of life could not
account for the encoding of this tremendous amount of data.
The "warm little pond" scenario was invented ad hoc to serve as a ma
terialistic reductionist explanation of the origin of life It is unsupported
University Press, 1964)
1 7

Guye, reported in du Nouy, pp 33-34, and cited by Coppedge, Evolution Possible
or Impossible7 ρ 234
10

Chandra Wickramasinghe's testimony appears in Norman L Geisler, The Creator
in the Courtroom Scopes II (Milford, MI Mott Media, 1982), pp 148-53
Sir Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, Evolution from Space (New York
Simon and Shuster, 1981), idem, "Hoyle on Evolution," Nature, November 12,1981, ρ
105
See, for example, Hubert Ρ Yockey, 'An Application of Information Theory to the
Central Dogma and the Sequence Hypothesis," Journal of Theoretical Biology 46
(1974) 369-406
2 1

Robert Gange, Origins and Destiny (Waco, TX Word Books, 1986), pp 162-64
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by any other evidence and it will remain ad hoc until such evidence is
found. . . . One must conclude that, contrary to the established and current wisdom a scenario describing the genesis of life on earth by
chance and natural causes which can be accepted on the basis of fact
and not faith has not yet been written.22
True, these studies do not completely rule out naturalism. However, they do present a formidable roadblock to a rational formulation of a naturalistic theory for the origin of life.
Some naturalists hold that since life exists, naturalistic evolution must have occurred, in spite of the improbabilities. Others contend that some as yet unknown laws must have allowed life to begin
without the action of any supernatural Being, again in spite of the
improbabilities. These solutions beg the question. It is circular to assume naturalistic evolution to be the case in spite of the evidence
against such nontheistic solutions.
Naturalism cannot account for the origin of life. Naturalism requires spontaneous generation and ignores an array of enormous odds
against chance development of human life.

Theistic Argumentation
When theistic argumentation is brought up, a negative response
is often evoked. Few care to approach the question of God's existence
by venturing into the world of abstract reasoning. Yet different avenues of inquiry have appeared in what had been treated by some as
a stalemate. And again naturalism appears to be losing ground.
Time magazine noted that a "quiet revolution" taking place in
philosophical circles has reopened the logical quest for a rational
theism. Pointing out that science has been less presumptuous and
closed minded on such issues in recent years, the article notes the revival of newly refined arguments for God's existence, many of which
utilize the "modern techniques of analytic philosophy and symbolic
logic that were once used to discredit belief."23
John Donnelly edited an anthology of essays by key philosophers in the linguistic analytic tradition who argue for a revival of
certain forms of natural theology. Donnelly also points out the irony
of using such philosophical techniques in this way when they had
once been considered anathema to any theological formulation. 24
Theistic argumentation has taken on some decidedly new fea-

Hubert P. Yockey, "A Calculation of the Probability of Spontaneous Biogenesis by
Information Theory," Journal of Theoretical Biology 67 (1977): 396.
23
24

"Modernizing the Case for God," Time, April 7, 1980, pp. 65-66, 68.

John Donnelly, ed., Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972), "Editor's Preface."
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tures in contemporary thought. Even some scholars who have not
been very interested in the past are taking more notice. Rather than
developing any specific case, a few recent trends will simply be
noted.
For example Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, both previously nontheistic, have concluded that God must exist. To counter their own
agnosticism, they concluded that one is "driven, almost inescapably"
to the conclusion that a Creator is responsible for the design and
spread of life in the universe. In fact Hoyle and Wickramasinghe
concluded that these calculations conclusively demonstrate the exis
tence of God, so much so that it can no longer be questioned on scien
tific grounds, for the Creator's existence has been brought "into the
realm of empirical science." 25
Yockey's research has led others to accept God's existence.
Gange asserts that though vast quantities of information were uti
lized when the first living things appeared, nature itself was not
the source of this complexity. 2 6 Capitalizing on Yockey's statement
that the vast information in living systems is the same as the math
ematical pattern of a written language, 2 7 Geisler asks how such could
result from a chance system. Some, however, hold that it is unjusti
fied to "jump" from such data to God's existence. But definite and ex
tremely complex patterns of information proceed from intelligence.
One is justified, Geisler argues, in concluding that this data pro
ceeded, not from chance development, but from an intelligent, or
dered beginning. 2 8
Naturalism, in its attempt to explain life, must resort to some
form of infinite regress. But Craig, among others, utilized the cosmological argument for God's existence to argue cogently that infinite
regress in the universe is not possible, according to the canons of both
philosophy and science. For instance any infinite temporal regress of
events is an actual infinite and therefore cannot exist. Also a tempo
ral series of events is a collection formed by successive addition, but
it cannot be an actual infinite. 29

Wickramasinghe in Geisler, The Creator in the Courtroom
cf Evolution from Space, ρ 130
2

"

Scopes II, pp 148-53,

Gange, Origins and Destiny, p p 79-80

Yockey states, "The sequence hypothesis applies directly to the protein and the
genetic text as well as to written language and therefore the treatment is mathemati
cally identical" (Hubert Ρ Yockey, "Self-Organization Origin of Life Scenarios and
Information Theory," Journal of Theoretical Biology 91 [1981] 16)
2

° Norman L Geisler, "The Collapse of Modern Atheism," in The Intellectuals Speak
Out about God, ed Roy A Varghese (Chicago Regnery Gateway, 1984), pp 142-44

2

"

William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (New York Barnes and
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Astronomy uses the expansion of the universe to date its absolute
beginning, which again makes infinite regress untenable. Also the
second law of thermodynamics reveals that the universe is running
down, thereby pointing u p that the universe is a finite number of
years old. For Craig, the only way out of the dilemma is to conclude
that God exists and is personal in that He chose to create the uni
verse. 3 0
One other approach to the existence of God should be mentioned.
This is the eclectic, cumulative argument recently popularized by
Swinburne, who holds that while individual deductive theistic ar
guments are not compelling, the total inductive effect of many of
them lends probable weight to theism. 3 1
The current revival of theistic arguments, from the analytic
philosophical tradition and from contemporary science, is yet an
other sign of the current dissatisfaction with naturalism. Since infi
nite regress is untenable, these arguments take on new significance,
both individually and collectively. They provide the best explana
tion for the existence of the universe and life, which cannot be said
for the naturalistic hypothesis.

Philosophy of the Mind
One of the most forceful, recent threats to naturalism is new de
velopments in the philosophy of the mind. In particular, evidence
for life after death is one of the most important ingredients in a the
istic system. 3 2
Empirical studies have gone far beyond the more popular works
over a decade ago that reported several investigations of near-death
experiences. Many skeptical scholars noted that anecdotal accounts
of dying persons who report similar experiences are not admissible as
scientific data and are equally well explained by hallucinations or
by other medical or psychological hypotheses. However, new data
have disproved such alternative theses according to their own em
pirical criteria and have presented strong evidence at least for a

Noble, 1979), part II His particular form of the cosmological argument, called the
Kalam argument, refers to the impossibility of infinite regression
^
Ibid , p p 110-40 Also see William Lane Craig, The Existence of God and the Be
ginning of the Universe (San Bernardino Here's Life Publishers, 1979), esp pp 83-91
Di

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1979)

For some other aspects of this subject not discussed here, but which give further
evidence of the duahstic nature of man, see J Ρ Moreland, Scaling the Secular City A
Defense of Christianity (Grand Rapids Baker Book House, 1987), chap 3, and
Lawrence W Wood, "Recent Brain Research and the Mind-Body Dilemma," Asbury
Theological Journal 41 (1986) 37-78
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minimalistic view of life after death. Two points in particular will
be mentioned: corroborative experiences and corroborative testing. 33
Many cases have been reported in which dying persons viewed
individuals, events, or circumstances in another place with amazing
accuracy when they were comatose. In other words they reported independently corroborative data that would not normally have been
in the range of their sense experience even if they were fully conscious at the time, in spite of the fact that they were near death or
already pronounced dead. Some of these reports were investigated
using rather ingenious controls and other quantitative data. This research found that at least some of these persons reported facts that
they could not have known by natural means.
Another type of corroboration is from cases in which an individual, after a near-death experience, reports having just seen a loved
one whom he claims was also deceased. In the more evidential cases,
the loved one was not previously known to have been dead either by
the one who was near death or in some cases by anyone immediately
involved. As a result, the experiencer was sometimes so convicted
that his entire attitude toward death was altered to a sense of
peace, well-being, and even a desire to be with the loved one. Later
it was discovered that the other individual had already died,
sometimes at that very hour.
Some near-death experiences have been reported during the absence of brain waves. Eminent cardiologist Schoonmaker announced
the results of his 18-year study of 1,400 near-death experiences, including those of about 55 persons whose experiences took place while
flat EEG readings were recorded. 34 The most vivid experiences these
people had, many of which were also corroborative, occurred when
their brains registered no known activity, sometimes for periods of 30
minutes to three hours. This is strong evidence that consciousness
may exist after death. It is of course conceivable that the EEG may
not in fact measure all brain activity (though at the present time the
absence of brain wave function in the EEG is both the best and the
most widely accepted definition of brain death).
Independently corroborative experiences and testing also compliment each other. While there was no brain or heart activity, individuals have reported near-death experiences that were independently verified by others, even over a distance. A woman with a flat
EEG reading and no vital signs had been declared dead. She sponta-

00

The following data are the result of a lengthy investigation to be presented in a
forthcoming book on the subject of evidence for life after death
^ Some of this information was received from a personal interview with Fred
Schoonmaker, June 1,1982
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neously revived about three and one-half hours later. She reported
floating above her body during the resuscitation attempts. She described precisely the procedures used to try to rescue her, how many
persons came into the room, what was said (she even related a joke
that was told to relieve the tension), and most interestingly, she reported the designs on the doctors' ties. All of this information was
carefully checked with the medical records and with the doctors
who were present, and it was discovered that her total description
was correct, even though her EEG reading was flat during this time. 35
This combination of flat EEG readings and empirically corroborative scientific data presents strong evidence for at least a minimalistic view of life after death, which disproves a major pillar of naturalistic thought. In fact even the many other cases of clinical (or
reversible) death that are accompanied by corroboration, sometimes
of a rather spectacular variety, are also good evidence since these
verified observations themselves are unexplained in known natural
terms and because they evidence consciousness beyond the initial
states of death. Therefore while irreversible death has obviously
not occurred in these instances, the crucial point is that these occurrences are not explained by any known bodily function, since clinical
death (and sometimes brain inactivity) has already occurred. This
consciousness presents evidence strong enough to indicate a probable
case for the initial stages of life after death.
This minimalistic life, however, is not a detailed heavenly existence; irreversible death is not required in order to establish the
point being made here. Rather, if the brain is not functioning (or is
otherwise unable to account for the corroborated phenomena in
question) and the person is still verifiably conscious during that
time, then such is minimalistic life at that moment. Thus if
veridical consciousness is both separate from and extends beyond
brain activity, there is no reason to think that, just because the latter
has not irreversibly ceased, one can somehow magically account for
this life by naturalistic means. Since such intellectual faculties
therefore exist independent of brain activity (and even when it has
momentarily ceased), there is no viable reason to assume that the
permanent cessation of brain activity would affect personal consciousness. This data actually provides strong evidence for consciousness beyond death precisely because such has both survived temporary brain cessation and cannot be explained by normal bodily activity anyway.

This specific case is reported by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross. For example see her essay
"The Experience of Death," in The Vestibule, ed. Jess Weiss (New York: Pocket Books,
1972), pp. 57-64; cf. "Life after Death?" Newsweek, July 12, 1976, p. 41.
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In an article in The Humanist, Beloff argued that the evidence
is strong enough that even humanists should admit survival after
death and try to interpret it in naturalistic terms. Perhaps this signals a new shift in attitude on this subject. Beloff stated that the evidence points to a "dualistic world where mind or spirit has an existence separate from the world of material things." He admitted
that this could "present a challenge to Humanism as profound in its
own way as that which Darwinian Evolution did to Christianity a
century ago." Yet, he added, naturalists "cannot afford to close our
minds . . . to the possibility of some kind of survival." 36
In an American Psychological Association convention a panel
discussed the nature of near-death experiences. Only one of the panelists, UCLA psychologist Ronald Siegel, held that those could be
explained totally by natural means. However, when challenged
later by cardiologist Michael Sabom to explain his then unpublished
corroborative accounts by naturalistic means, Siegel responded that
he was unable to do so. The other panel members agreed that neardeath research points to or provides evidence for a spiritual realm
and life after death. 3 7
Some may object that subjective phenomena such as hallucinations or perhaps a combination of physiological and psychological
causes are able to account for such data. Whereas some examples can
certainly be explained in such a manner, these attempts cannot provide an adequate account of those cases which are accompanied by
objective corroboration, since they indicate that something has actually been perceived beyond merely subjective categories.
A common question is whether such experiences can be explained
by brain activity. That is, could not the physical (or material) body
be viewed as the cause? However, the reported cases where brain
activity was absent provide a major critique of that view. Also the
examples of multiple near-death experiences in which an individual
reports veridical information concerning the death of another who
had "gone on before" provide possible data regarding the deceased
individual which is not accounted for by the reporter's brain function.
The suggestion that the latter information could have been received by telepathy from a living person (or by some similar means)
does not account for the conviction of well-being and the peaceful desire to be with the deceased, since such mental information would
presumably include the fact of the death and a negative emotional

" John Beloff, as cited in David Winter, Hereafter What Happens after Death7
(Wheaton, IL Harold Shaw Publishers, 1972), pp 33-34
'Near-Death Experiences Defy Single Explanation," Brain-Mind
September 14,1981, pp 1,3

Bulletin,
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reaction from the one from whom the information was "received." In
other words if the near-death experiencer had somehow learned of
the death of the loved one from a living individual, this would not
account for the sense of peaceful contentment and the willingness to
join the loved one.
By way of contrast, how many persons in everyday life react
positively when suddenly informed of the death of a loved one? Yet
those who claim to discover such information from the newly deceased person while both are near death do seem to respond positively. While those cases do not constitute proof, they do provide
further evidence for initial life after the death of the body
(including the brain). 38
Some ask, How can one gain evidence for life after death from
individuals who have not yet died? The medical distinction must be
made between biological death, which is physically irreversible,
and clinical death, which is a cessation of measurements such as
pulse or heartbeat. (Near-death experiences are not viewed as miraculous returns from biological death, though such would provide an
additional reason to reject naturalism!) It is difficult to deny that
there are many cases of corroborated experiences beyond (and during)
clinical death.
But do the latter actually qualify as evidence for life after
death? Life after death should not be misinterpreted as some mystical dimension; in its simplest (or minimalistic) form, it indicates conscious life beyond the death of the physical body. But could such
life always depend, perhaps in some subtle way, on the central nervous system? If not, then it would seem that such experiences are evidence of minimalistic life after death. Verifiable consciousness
while brain readings are nonexistent (a sort of middle ground between clinical death and irreversible death) and veridical reports
regarding those who have already died (occasionally some time before) together point to life beyond at least the initial stages of death.
Do not those individuals always report a beautiful, heavenlike
environment, and are not these reports given by even non-Christians?
Various responses could be given. Not all have reported blissful experiences; many persons have also noted the sensation of being in
hell. However, since it has already been acknowledged that none of
these persons has actually suffered biological (irreversible) death,
why should they have in fact gone to hell at all? Perhaps, it is argued, they did not see hell because they had not finally died. Here
it must also be remembered that positive experiences by dying per-

° Other scenarios are also possible but do not seem to account for the known data adequately.
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sons need not be interpreted as a trip to heaven; it could simply have
been the immediate relief from cancer or an injury-wracked body.
One medical researcher has produced evidence that many people
who did not remember anything at all from the time they were near
death could actually have had hellish experiences but subsequently
blocked them out of their minds. 3 9
Detailed interpretations of one's experiences are notoriously
tricky things. Interpretations of the same data vary widely from
person to person, and accounts frequently differ from what most oth
ers perceive. A related conclusion is that people's near-death expla
nations reflect popular concepts of the afterlife held at that time. 4 0
Near-death experiences therefore cannot be used to describe (or
interpret) heaven or hell but only to argue that certain types of ve
ridical information do confirm the minimalistic conclusion that con
scious life has been corroborated beyond at least the initial stages of
death and that such cannot viably be explained by brain (or other
bodily) activity. That such consciousness exists beyond the veil of
death does seem to be a fact and as such is a serious problem for natu
ralism. 4 1

Conclusion
A number of factors suggest that the influence of naturalism may
be declining. Scientific investigation is still held in great esteem but
a broader view of the universe is becoming more widely accepted.
While many thinkers agree that naturalism is insufficient, this
is sometimes as far as their agreement extends. In reality, then, the
newer attitude is actually a conglomeration of perspectives, with be
liefs about the "supernatural," for example, ranging from pantheism
to theism. Therefore one must be cautious in making generalizations
as if this were a single movement.
At any rate there is undoubtedly a greater interest in philosoph
ical and theological topics that were frequently considered taboo by

J y

For details on such reports of hell, see Maurice Rawlings, Beyond Death's Door
(Nashville Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1978) Also see his sequel, Before Death
Comes (Nashville Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1980)

υ
For example Carol Zaleski has found that medieval accounts of near-death expe
riences, in contrast to contemporary ones, gave an especially prominent place to the
torments of hell, since this was perhaps the major feature of the teaching at that
time Today many say that such an experience will be blissful because God is not judg
mental and accepts all persons Zaleski concludes that the interpretation of these ex
periences is largely conditioned by what people popularly believe at that time
(Other-World Journeys Accounts of Near-Death Experiences in Medieval and Modern
Times [Oxford Oxford University Press, 1987])

Space does not permit the consideration of further objections here But the data do
suggest a strong case which can withstand criticism
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many just a generation ago. One could reject the view that an actual
paradigm shift is occurring and still maintain the more important
conclusion that naturalism is incorrect in a number of areas.
Naturalism employs a too narrow methodology, it cannot meaningfully account for the origin of life, there is strong evidence for
God's existence, and there is strong evidence for at least a minimalistic concept of life after death. All this is extremely damaging to the
naturalistic thesis. In fact if the criticisms of naturalism in even one
of these areas are correct, naturalism is difficult to defend. For
example naturalism must be able to explain life in order to be a comprehensive world view. Likewise, if God exists, naturalism simply
cannot be true.
This article is not an apologetic for a particular world view. Instead the article has sought to survey some reasons for the downfall
of naturalism. Some evidences have been suggested that are at least
in harmony with a theistic system.
Some non-Christian thinkers, who also reject naturalism, might
claim that their world views are likewise compatible with this
data. Some have embraced Eastern thought and therefore disagree
significantly with Christian theism too.
With this tendency toward Eastern philosophy, areas that demand attention and critique include certain extravagances in scientific interpretation, the unverifiability of strict monism, occultic
tendencies, questions concerning the reality of evil, pointers to the
personhood of God, and the lack of consideration of God's miraculous
acts in history. And yet, seen from one angle, this new mindset might
still be considered a welcome relief to the sterility of naturalism,
even though critiques must still be forthcoming.
The prospect of a possible shift toward "religion,"42 even of a
general (and mixed) variety, should encourage Christians to become
more engaged in apologetics. If an ideological shift is occurring,
Christian thinkers should be in the forefront. Some who hold other
world views such as certain forms of Eastern thought attempt to compete with Christians in the area of evangelism, and religious openness may not exist for long; the new trends could possibly be swayed
significantly in one direction or another. With such an opportunity
perhaps unavailable in recent times, Christians must not pass up the
opportunity afforded by the present intellectual climate to influence
their generation with a theism that is truly Christian.

One intriguing topic concerns the extent to which Eastern views are open to truly
supernatural concepts such as God's actions in history or His interaction in the lives of
believers. It might in fact be argued that the Eastern (New Age?) tendencies are actually a type of expanded naturalism that embraces a few quasi-theistic concepts.
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